The FROST technique detailed in the Ars Technica report represents more than incremental tracking evolution; it exposes a hardware-level side channel that directly leverages SSD I/O contention through Origin Private File System (OPFS) APIs, enabling websites to fingerprint concurrent applications and tabs with convolutional neural networks trained on latency traces. While the source correctly notes file-size and storage-location constraints, it underplays the vector's resilience against sandboxing and its alignment with a decade-long pattern of hardware side-channel exploitation—from Spectre and Meltdown cache-timing attacks documented in 2018 IEEE papers to more recent Rowhammer-induced DRAM interference studies in USENIX Security 2023. Researchers missed the operational intelligence angle: this method could integrate into state-level surveillance pipelines targeting dissidents or supply-chain adversaries by correlating SSD activity patterns with known operational security lapses, much like how earlier browser fingerprinting fed into NSA's XKEYSCORE enhancements revealed in Snowden documents. Cross-referencing with the original DIMVA 2026 paper and prior work on JavaScript-based storage timing (e.g., 'Storage Timing Attacks' in ACM CCS 2022), the attack's Linux portability and expected Windows extension indicate broad hardware applicability beyond Apple Silicon, where M2 testing succeeded. Browser vendors' proposed mitigations like OPFS size caps ignore firmware-level SSD scheduling that remains exposed, signaling an urgent need for hardware abstraction layers in future standards.