Pucci sentenced to 27 months for Tesla app remote control in 30 DV charges

Sydney woman Stacey reported the Tesla Model alarm activation and subsequent dashboard reset on 1 November 2025. Police documents show Pucci added a parental profile granting sole remote access via the Tesla app. Over the following eleven days he toggled extreme temperature settings, activated Valet Mode limiting speed to 40 km/h on public roads, and issued threats referencing live map and control data.

Court records document four years of coercive control that included the 2020 abduction of Stacey's child and a 2021 strangulation. The 30 convictions encompass the app-based harassment as a distinct vector that removed the victim's operational control of her primary transport. No multi-factor authentication or profile revocation logs were required by the Tesla app at the time of the offences.

Connected-vehicle platforms concentrate actuator authority in a single authenticated session. When that session is shared or compromised, physical safety and location data become directly weaponisable. Similar patterns appear in documented smart-home and vehicle telematics abuse cases tracked by the Australian Institute of Criminology and US National Domestic Violence Hotline IoT reports.

Tesla has not published post-incident telemetry or app permission changes. Regulatory filings in Australia and the EU now require connected-car manufacturers to log and surface third-party profile additions within 24 hours; compliance deadlines begin Q3 2026.