The Dutch FIOD seizure of 800 servers tied to Stark Industries and its successor WorkTitans B.V. marks a rare, high-volume disruption of infrastructure explicitly enabling Russian information operations and DDoS campaigns. Unlike typical cybercrime takedowns focused on botnets or ransomware, this operation targeted the physical and connectivity layer—Mirhosting’s Amsterdam-Frankfurt pipes—that allowed sanctioned Belarusian and Russian entities to maintain European reach after the May 2023 EU designation. The rapid migration to WorkTitans as a front company illustrates a maturing sanctions-evasion playbook now common across Eastern European hosting providers. This pattern echoes the 2022 takedown of Russian-linked bulletproof hosters documented in EUROPOL’s IOCTA reports and aligns with recent German and Swedish actions against providers serving pro-Kremlin hacktivist groups like NoName057(16). The investigation’s emphasis on indirect economic support to sanctioned actors signals a shift toward treating hosting services as critical enablers in hybrid warfare rather than mere commercial facilitation. European regulators have historically under-prioritized colocation and high-bandwidth transit nodes; the scale of this raid suggests that threshold has been crossed, with implications for data-center due-diligence regimes and real-time abuse-signal sharing across EU member states.