The reported memorandum of understanding between Washington and Tehran represents a tactical pause rather than a strategic resolution, extending the April ceasefire by 60 days while deferring core disputes over Iran's nuclear breakout capacity and ballistic missile ranges. This framework prioritizes immediate relief through Strait of Hormuz reopening and partial sanctions easing, yet it underestimates sequencing risks where Tehran could retain highly enriched uranium stockpiles during the interim period, echoing the verification failures that doomed the 2015 JCPOA. Israel's February 28 air campaign launch alongside US forces introduces an unaddressed variable: any deal excluding Jerusalem's security guarantees risks renewed escalation, as seen in Hezbollah's parallel Lebanon theater. US blockade effects on Iranian exports have already strained regime revenue more than public estimates suggest, but lifting port restrictions without ironclad enrichment caps to 5% risks rapid reconstitution of weapons-grade material. Historical patterns from 2018 JCPOA withdrawal to current indirect talks indicate negotiators consistently overstate proximity to closure, with technical teams historically requiring 18-24 months for verifiable limits on centrifuges and R&D. The absence of explicit missile range restrictions in the preliminary text signals a US concession that could embolden further Iranian conventional deterrence postures targeting Gulf energy infrastructure.