The HTTP/2 Bomb exploit, chaining HPACK compression abuse with sustained Slowloris-style memory holds, demonstrates how decade-old protocol flaws can be recombined into near-instantaneous denial-of-service vectors against default configurations of NGINX, Apache, IIS, Envoy, and Cloudflare Pingora. While the source coverage correctly notes the attack's low barrier—executable from a 100 Mbps residential link within seconds—it understates the systemic risk: over 880,000 exposed sites represent critical chokepoints in e-commerce, government portals, and financial infrastructure. The technique bypasses prior mitigations by exploiting per-entry bookkeeping rather than decoded header size, evading caps introduced after CVE-2016-6581 and CVE-2025-53020. This pattern mirrors earlier protocol-layer assaults such as the 2012 Slowloris and 2016 HPACK disclosures, yet the novel synthesis via OpenAI Codex signals a shift where machine-assisted code analysis can surface combinations humans overlooked. Beyond the reported patches in NGINX and Apache, the absence of fixes for IIS, Envoy, and Pingora creates asymmetric exposure windows that state actors could exploit in coordinated campaigns against Western digital supply chains, echoing the 2021 Log4Shell fallout. The original reporting also misses the intelligence angle: such low-signature, high-amplification attacks complicate attribution and response, potentially enabling hybrid operations that degrade civilian services without kinetic escalation.