Grok Build Default Settings Exposed 35,000+ Public Apps Including SpaceXSI Data
Default public links on Grok Build exposed 35,000 apps containing proprietary SpaceXSI data. Path-based secrecy used by Claude and ChatGPT prevents the same DNS leakage. Other AI builders remain vulnerable until defaults and URL design change.
A passive DNS scan identified 43,601 grok.me endpoints. More than 35,000 returned live applications with stored data visible to any visitor. Default link permissions remained "Anyone with the link" until manually changed to invited users or private. Tests confirmed the setting could not be altered at creation time.
Cursor, recently acquired by SpaceXSI, stated apps are private by default. Aprozper's direct checks contradicted this. Claude, ChatGPT shared links, and Gemini place randomness in the URL path rather than the subdomain, preventing DNS enumeration. Lovable, Bolt, and Replit share the same exposure vector but at lower volumes.
The incident shows that AI coding platforms inherit web-app sharing patterns without enforcing path-based secrecy. SpaceXSI removed exposed artifacts after inquiry but issued no customer notification timeline. Other builders face identical enumeration risks until link defaults change to private and path tokens replace subdomain tokens.
No CVE has been assigned. Platform operators must audit share-link generation before additional acquisitions embed the same defaults.
Sources (3)
- [1]Ars Technica Report on Grok Build Leak(https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/11/grok-build-coding-agent-leaks-oodles-of-confidential-info-some-belonging-to-spacexsi/)
- [2]Passive DNS Survey of .me Subdomains(https://www.censys.io/reports/2026-grok-me-enumeration)
- [3]xAI Grok Build Changelog v1.4(https://github.com/xai-org/grok-build/releases/tag/v1.4)