Atlantic Article Links Pardon Limits and House Expansion to Executive Accountability

The Atlantic piece argues that narrowing the pardon authority while enlarging the House would begin rebalancing institutional incentives that have favored executive discretion since the post-Watergate reforms. Historical data show pardon grants rose from 382 under Ford to over 1,900 under Obama, with self-pardons and family members becoming routine after 2016. These patterns track Congress's failure to update its own capacity, leaving the chamber at 435 members despite a population that has more than doubled since 1913. Evidence from CRS reports and House apportionment studies indicates that fixed size reduces individual member leverage over appropriations and investigations. A larger House would increase committee seats and district-level pressure on spending bills, directly constraining the executive's unilateral tools. The article understates how both reforms require the same procedural change: House rules alterations that current leadership has blocked since 2011. Without those internal shifts, statutory limits on pardons remain subject to the same veto and override dynamics that preserved broad executive latitude for five decades.