
Russia-linked Cold Relic used stolen cloud data to compromise second organization
Russia-linked Cold Relic used stolen cloud data and employee identities from one U.S. organization to impersonate trusted contacts and compromise a second organization. The case shows how attackers can turn cloud drives, directories and correspondence into a reusable espionage tool. It matters because trusted collaboration platforms can become the bridge between victims, exposing government, defense and nonprofit networks.
Russia-linked hacking group Cold Relic used stolen cloud drive contents and employee directories from one U.S. organization to impersonate trusted contacts and compromise a second organization, according to a Mandiant report published Wednesday. In the first intrusion, in late 2025, the attackers took control of an administrator account, downloaded the organization's entire cloud drive and directories, then remained inside for months. They searched for emails, passwords and personnel records, and continued reading email through third-party applications even after the victim changed passwords and reset sessions.
The evidence trail centers on abuse of trusted cloud data flows. After the first breach, the group used the stolen correspondence and identities to approach a target at another U.S. organization through an encrypted messaging app. The lure was a document tied to the conversation, then a phishing link aimed at Microsoft account login details and authentication tokens. Once inside the second organization, the attackers downloaded large amounts of cloud storage data. Google said Cold Relic also uses compromised websites to hide phishing destinations and assess visitors before showing malicious content.
Cold Relic, also called ColdRiver, has been tracked since 2015 and has targeted government officials, defense contractors and nonprofits across Europe and North America. U.S. authorities have linked the group to Russia's Federal Security Service, while Mandiant's report supplies the technical chain: persistent access, bulk collection of directory and cloud data, and reuse of stolen relationships. The pattern is less a single phishing success than a systemic abuse of trusted collaboration tools, where identity, context and familiar documents make later intrusions harder to spot.
The immediate exposure is organizational: once attackers hold cloud drives, directories and correspondence, they can move from one victim to another by sounding like a colleague or partner. Google did not identify the two U.S. organizations or say what data was taken, limiting public assessment of scale. But the documented method shows why cloud migration without strong token controls, third-party app review and relationship-aware phishing defenses leaves professional networks exposed, especially where defense and government work depends on trusted contacts.
Government, defense and nonprofit organizations can be breached not only by direct phishing but by attackers reusing stolen cloud data to sound like trusted colleagues, widening exposure across professional networks.
Sources (1)
- [1]Original source(https://therecord.media/russia-cyber-espionage-google)