The 600,000-entry breach at Lithuania's Centre of Registers represents far more than an isolated credential theft; it underscores Russia's deliberate strategy of harvesting sovereign data troves to map and compromise Baltic state functions. Lithuanian prosecutors correctly flagged foreign state involvement without naming the actor, yet opposition voices and patterns from prior operations point squarely to Russian intelligence services exploiting authorized institutional logins. This method mirrors the 2007 Estonian attacks and subsequent intrusions into Latvian and Lithuanian systems, where data exfiltration serves dual purposes: enabling kinetic hybrid actions like sabotage planning and generating leverage through kompromat on military, diplomatic, and political figures. Mainstream reporting underplays how such registries function as force multipliers for influence operations, allowing precise targeting that amplifies Russia's ongoing campaign of arson, vandalism, and disinformation across NATO's eastern flank. Unlike supply-chain incidents such as the Grafana or Oncology Institute breaches, this operation demonstrates state-level persistence against critical national registers rather than opportunistic criminality. The resignation of Centre of Registers head Adrijus Jusas signals internal accountability gaps that adversaries exploit, while immediate credential resets reveal reactive rather than resilient defenses. Broader trends indicate data warfare is evolving from disruption to pre-positioning for coercion, a dimension missed when coverage treats each leak as standalone.