Credential Theft, Prompt Hijacks, and Proxy Impersonation Are the Same Brittle Control Layer

Across the Factum archive, three clusters that appear unrelated actually share one failure mode. The DGFiP credential intrusions, LexisNexis third-party vendor breach, ShieldBreak CLFS swap, and the 737 Russian SOCKS5 Chrome extensions all demonstrate that once an identity token or execution context is accepted, downstream controls collapse. The older and recent AI items reveal the identical pattern at model level: Japanese prompts zeroing Claude’s nuclear-launch rate, RLHF mapped to scalable censorship, and arXiv 2608.12325 framing reasoning itself as a learnable rule set that can be rewritten. The hidden link is that “authentication” has become a single primitive—whether a stolen password, a browser extension manifest, a system call chain, or a prompt prefix—whose compromise instantly rewrites behavior. What is missing entirely is any reporting on how the same low-cost techniques now used to hijack browsers or government portals are already being productized inside the new wave of browser-local agents (HashAgent) and mid-tier Chinese models priced to undercut OpenAI. The result is that the attack surface previously limited to nation-state operators is now available to anyone who can craft a prompt or buy a $0.20/million-token endpoint.