The active exploitation of the Funnel Builder plugin vulnerability reveals more than a single flaw: it demonstrates how WordPress plugin architectures routinely bypass permission checks on exposed endpoints, enabling unauthenticated attackers to persist malicious scripts across checkout flows. Sansec's observation of Google Tag Manager-mimicking payloads loading WebSocket-based skimmers from protect-wss[.]com aligns with longstanding Magecart tactics, yet coverage underplays the broader pattern of plugin marketplaces serving as unvetted vectors for financial data theft affecting over 40,000 stores. This incident connects directly to the recent Sucuri-reported Joomla backdoor campaigns, where remote loaders similarly allow dynamic attacker control without file modification, suggesting a coordinated shift toward supply-chain persistence in e-commerce platforms. Original reporting missed the intelligence angle: such skimmers not only enable immediate card theft but could feed into larger financial intelligence operations if scaled against high-volume merchants, underscoring the absence of runtime integrity checks in popular plugins. Merchants must treat External Scripts settings as high-risk surfaces and implement automated monitoring beyond simple updates.