The Megalodon campaign's injection of malicious GitHub Actions across 5,561 repositories in a six-hour window on May 18 represents more than a supply-chain incident; it marks the maturation of automated, high-velocity poisoning tactics that treat open-source platforms as force multipliers for credential harvesting. SafeDep's analysis correctly identifies the dual-payload approach—one for persistent workflow triggers on push/PR events and another for dormant backdoors via workflow_dispatch—but understates the operational sophistication: the use of two rotating commit-author emails enabled 5,718 coordinated pushes without triggering GitHub's rate-limit heuristics, a technique refined from earlier campaigns such as the 2023 Mini Shai-Hulud NPM compromise. Where prior reporting on TanStack and Tiledesk infections focused on single-package hijacks, Megalodon demonstrates lateral movement across unrelated maintainers by compromising build pipelines upstream, allowing poisoned source to propagate through legitimate NPM publishes. This pattern aligns with Ox Security's warning that granular-token invalidation alone fails to address repository-level persistence. Downstream consequences for enterprises are immediate: exfiltration of AWS, GCP, Azure, and Kubernetes secrets from CI runners creates ready-made pivot points into production environments, accelerating the shift from opportunistic malware to targeted intelligence collection. Without mandatory workflow signing and commit-author provenance checks, the attack surface will continue expanding exponentially.