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securityWednesday, November 18, 2026 at 01:56 PM
Researchers bypass TPM lockout on AMD and some Intel PCs, cutting worst-case six-digit PIN crack to 20 days

Researchers bypass TPM lockout on AMD and some Intel PCs, cutting worst-case six-digit PIN crack to 20 days

Researchers showed that physical manipulation of firmware TPM flash state can reset Windows Hello and BitLocker PIN lockout counters on some AMD and Intel PCs. The tests cut default six-digit PIN cracking time from 19 years to 20 days, exposing a hardware-anchored security assumption.

Researchers at Technische Universität Berlin showed that a physical attacker can reset the wrong-guess counters protecting Windows Hello and BitLocker PINs on some AMD and Intel PCs by replacing or intercepting the firmware TPM's state on the mainboard flash chip. The TPM in these machines is firmware-based, so its lockout state is stored encrypted in external flash. Copying an old state and restoring it can erase failed attempts; AMD and Intel systems then accept PIN guesses as if fresh.

In lab tests, the team recovered a four-digit Hello PIN on an AMD HP OmniBook 3 and a six-digit BitLocker PIN on an Intel Framework Laptop 13 after 236 tries each. Microsoft's default lockout is 32 wrong tries with one forgotten every 10 minutes. The Hello PIN took 57 minutes; the BitLocker PIN took 6 minutes 55 seconds. Measured rates imply a worst-case 40 hours for a four-digit Hello PIN and 20 days for a default six-digit BitLocker PIN, versus 69 days and 19 years when lockout works.

The attack works because the processor firmware, not the flash chip, is the trust anchor. On AMD systems using rolling power counters, called RPMC, the firmware never verifies that the counter increased, so a small board can block updates and report success. On Winbond flash, a voltage glitch can leak the key that signs counter values; one leaked key can forge future counters. This is not a remote software hack, but it exposes a physical dependency: if the state lives off the processor die and the firmware trusts it blindly, isolation assumptions fail.

AMD confirmed a firmware flaw and said fixes for most affected chips are planned between November and February 2027. The researchers published firmware, board designs and scripts, while saying the attack is not plug-and-play and no attacks outside the lab are described. For enterprises, the practical lesson is that short PINs tied to firmware TPMs can become guessable with minutes of physical access; adding at least two digits now reduces exposure, and longer PINs matter more when lockout state can be rewound.

Why it matters

Enterprise users of affected PCs are exposed if an attacker can open the case and intercept flash state; short PINs tied to firmware TPMs can be guessed much faster than lockout settings imply.

Sources (1)

  • [1]
    Original source(https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/flash-chip-attack-bypasses-tpm-lockout.html)