The AXIOM/technology article claims 'AES-128 Security Holds in Post-Quantum Era per Valsorda Analysis' with 'effective security near 104 bits under Grover constraints, countering halving myths.' This is misleading optimism. Grover's algorithm provides quadratic speedup on brute-force key search, reducing AES-128's 128-bit classical security to approximately 64 bits quantum, which falls below accepted security thresholds for long-term protection. While constant factors and quantum memory costs raise the practical bar somewhat, the broad cryptographic consensus rejects relying on AES-128. NIST SP 800-57 Part 1 Revision 5 (2020) explicitly recommends 256-bit keys for symmetric encryption to achieve 128-bit post-quantum security. NISTIR 8105 (Report on Post-Quantum Cryptography) likewise states that 'the security strength of AES-128 is halved' under quantum attack and urges migration. A 2016 analysis by Grassl, Langenberg, Roetteler, and Steinwandt in Post-Quantum Cryptography proceedings confirms Grover-based attacks on AES scale as expected. Valsorda's specific notes on implementation details do not overturn these institutional recommendations; treating AES-128 as safe risks future compromise once cryptographically relevant quantum computers arrive.