
BO Team Exploits Log4Shell in VMware vCenter 7.0.3 to Compromise Russian Software Firm's Code-Signing Server
Kaspersky documented BO Team's use of Log4Shell in VMware vCenter 7.0.3 to breach a Russian software developer and compromise its code-signing infrastructure. The quiet, months-long intrusion included hypervisor persistence and access to CI/CD systems. It matters because code-signing servers are central to software trust and supply-chain security.
The intrusion began with an exposed SSH service on a Linux terminal server, according to Kaspersky. Attackers mapped internal systems reachable through SMB, Kerberos, SSH, Telnet, FTP, HTTP, HTTPS, WinRM and LDAP, then pivoted to virtualization hosts. Failed logins to VMware vCenter did not stop the campaign. The team later exploited CVE-2021-44228, known as Log4Shell, in vCenter 7.0.3 to obtain a root command line.
Kaspersky said the attacker connected to a hypervisor over SSH, identified accessible hosts and planted a backdoor in /etc/cron.hourly/ under the name pgcache, likely to blend with PostgreSQL. The script fetched a second payload from a nofrillsdns[.]com domain and ran Global Socket, giving remote control. The campaign also touched proxy-sale[.]com, start.duckduckgo[.]com, vcsa.vmware[.]com and vulners[.]com, suggesting operational tradecraft and external staging.
Kaspersky linked the activity to BO Team, also called Black Owl, Hoody Hyena and Lifting Zmiy, a cluster active since at least 2023 and assessed by Orange Cyberdefense as Ukrainian-origin; the report did not attribute the operation to a state. The group's past operations mix espionage, hacktivism and infrastructure disruption against Russian entities. Here, however, the operation stayed quiet: no ransomware note, no Telegram claim and no public humiliation, a choice consistent with supply-chain preparation rather than spectacle.
The victim's identity was not disclosed, but Kaspersky said it develops software with customers in the Russian Federation and had all IT infrastructure components compromised, including CI/CD and a code-signing server. Kaspersky assessed the intrusion as likely to develop into a supply-chain scenario because code-signing servers underpin trust in distributed software. The case shows how a five-year-old Log4Shell exposure in a virtualization control plane can reach the heart of software production.
The unnamed Russian software developer's customers are exposed because the intrusion reached CI/CD and code-signing infrastructure, systems that determine whether software updates are trusted. It shows organizations that unpatched Log4Shell in virtualization control planes can compromise production pipelines.
Sources (1)
- [1]Original source(https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/bo-team-exploits-log4shell-in-vmware.html)