The 1Password integration with OpenAI Codex marks a pivotal shift where credential controls move from external vaults into the runtime of autonomous coding agents themselves. Original reporting correctly flags the risks of secrets in .env files and prompt injection but underplays how this pattern scales beyond software development to defense contractors and critical infrastructure pipelines, where agentic AI now handles deployment scripts. Related incidents, such as MCP hijacking of Claude Code OAuth tokens and prompt injection via comments in GitHub Copilot, reveal a consistent failure mode: agents inherit full user privileges without custody boundaries. By issuing just-in-time, scoped credentials that never enter model context, 1Password addresses the core governance gap, yet this creates a new single point of failure if the MCP server itself is compromised. Broader context from Google’s analysis of rising but low-sophistication prompt attacks and emerging NIST guidance on AI supply-chain risks shows security vendors must now treat developer agents as high-value targets equivalent to human operators. Failure to embed these controls will accelerate credential exfiltration campaigns by state actors targeting Western AI tooling stacks.