Michael Every, global strategist at Rabobank, has emerged as one of the clearest voices warning that diplomatic efforts over Iran's nuclear program and regional influence are failing, with further military escalation appearing unavoidable. In recent notes and interviews, Every highlights how Iran's rejection of U.S. demands—to relinquish enriched uranium, cease ballistic missile development, withdraw support for proxies, and reopen the Strait of Hormuz—leaves President Trump with limited options short of a 1956-style retreat or intensified strikes to seize control of vital energy chokepoints. This aligns with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's recent 60 Minutes interview, where he explicitly stated the Iran war 'is not over' despite significant achievements, citing remaining highly enriched uranium and enrichment sites that must still be addressed.

Mainstream coverage continues to emphasize potential negotiations and summits, yet Rabobank's analysis cuts through this by stressing structural realities: markets are underpricing the risk of sustained disruption to global energy flows, with oil already spiking above $100 amid the conflict. The timing is critical. Trump is scheduled to meet Xi Jinping in Beijing on May 13-15, 2026, where Iran is expected to dominate discussions alongside trade. As reported by The Guardian and CNBC, Trump enters these talks from a position of vulnerability, hoping China will leverage its influence over Iran—via military supplies and economic ties—to broker de-escalation and reopen the Strait. However, Beijing may extract a high price, potentially involving concessions on Taiwan, rare earths, or broader strategic recognition.

The deeper connection others miss is how this Middle East crisis serves as a pressure test for an emerging multipolar order. Every and related analyses from Politico note that China's learned lessons from the conflict position it strongly: it can choose to restrain Iran or allow prolonged pain that weakens the U.S. economy and alliances. This opens pathways to a 'Grand Bargain' encompassing U.S., Chinese, and Russian interests, including potential Ukraine resolutions, as hinted by Putin's recent comments. What mainstream diplomacy narratives overlook is the domestic political mirror: the center's failure amid energy shocks and economic strain is fueling populist surges. Germany's AfD polling at 28% nationally (41% in the east), UK's Labour facing leadership challenges after electoral losses, Australia's shift toward One Nation, and similar instability in Denmark all reflect voters rejecting market-friendly centrism in favor of harder lines on both left and right.

Rabobank's reporting frames this as the 'New Age of Empires,' where sustained conflict risks exponential economic damage and forces realignments that sideline traditional European and Western allies. The Iran episode is not isolated but symptomatic of great power competition where energy, military resolve, and political cohesion intersect. If the Beijing summit yields only temporary relief rather than structural deals, the path of 'more war' could accelerate fragmentation, higher inflation, and the very populist revolts already reshaping electorates from Berlin to Canberra. This heterodox view—prioritizing inevitable escalation over endless talks—deserves attention as markets and policymakers fixate on near-term diplomacy while systemic tensions build toward breaking points.