This arXiv preprint (not yet peer-reviewed) presents a theoretical intergenerational mean-field-type game (MFTG) model of Mali's multi-actor ecosystem, encompassing state forces, hunters, militias, jihadists, criminals, civil society, and proxies. Agents are characterized by type, state, information, and actions whose payoffs depend on the evolving population distribution rather than isolated choices. The model shows retaliatory 'revenger child-soldier' types create non-absorbing peaceful equilibria, allowing trauma-conditioned best responses to transmit violence across generations. War entrepreneurs exploit institutional fragility by injecting minimal resources for outsized returns via arms and contracting. Unlike standard game-theoretic treatments, the framework embeds information-adaptive transfers that reward verifiable peace actions and penalize aggression, shifting the equilibrium distribution toward peaceful types. No empirical sample or dataset is used; the work is purely mathematical, relying on mean-field approximations and equilibrium analysis with acknowledged limitations around behavioral assumptions, measurement of 'verifiable' peacebuilding, and real-time information structures. Related field research, such as International Crisis Group reports on Sahel militias, documents how similar profit-driven actors have sustained low-intensity conflict for years, a dynamic the model formalizes but does not test. Studies on intergenerational trauma transmission in West African conflicts further illustrate why revenger types persist absent structural payoffs. The preprint underplays implementation frictions, including elite capture of transfers and the difficulty of verifying actions amid fluid alliances—factors that could undermine the proposed incentive mechanisms in practice.