China's State Council 14th Five-Year Plan for Robotics (2021) and the MIIT 2023 humanoid robot guidelines outline explicit state subsidies and targets for low-cost automation to reduce manufacturing labor expenses by up to 40 percent. These documents emphasize domestic production scaling ahead of export deployment, directly aligning with observed patterns in electric vehicle and solar supply chains documented in WTO accession protocols and subsequent trade remedy filings. Western analyses, including the USITC 2023 report on advanced manufacturing imports, have tracked similar cost displacements in prior sectors but underweighted the labor-replacement angle now explicit in Chinese planning texts. Primary records from the EU's 2022 anti-subsidy investigation into Chinese EVs reveal parallel financing mechanisms that could extend to robotics components, suggesting coordinated rather than isolated sectoral shocks. Multiple policy perspectives emerge: Chinese state documents frame the initiative as productivity enhancement for global competitiveness, while trading partner submissions to the WTO highlight risks of concentrated supply dependencies without reciprocal market access. Coverage of the humanoid initiative has centered on unit pricing below $10,000 but has not connected these targets to the 2025 Made in China strategic milestones or to documented IP and standards-setting provisions in bilateral investment treaties. This leaves unexamined the potential for robotics exports to accelerate deindustrialization pressures already quantified in national trade statistics from Germany and the United States.