In a recent interview, Joe Kent, who served as Director of the US National Counterterrorism Center before resigning in protest over US actions against Iran, made explosive claims about American policy in the Syrian civil war. According to Kent, the United States 'worked directly with Al-Qaeda' and contributed to the rise of ISIS as part of a strategy to topple Bashar al-Assad, framing these efforts as aligned with Israeli security priorities rather than purely American interests.

Kent stated: 'We came in and we said: We’re going to work with the Israelis, but we’re also going to have to work heavily with the Sunni population on the ground in Syria to create an uprising.' He linked the origins of ISIS to operations supporting the Free Syrian Army, noting that 'the most effective guys initially were Al-Qaeda and then eventually ISIS,' and referenced Hillary Clinton’s emails as confirmation of collaboration with Al-Qaeda. He described ISIS as a 'brush fire we had started' that later required US intervention to contain.

These allegations highlight long-debated aspects of US proxy strategies in Syria. A 2012 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report, declassified through Judicial Watch, explicitly noted that Western powers, Gulf states, and Turkey supporting the Syrian opposition anticipated and welcomed the possibility of a 'Salafist principality' in eastern Syria to isolate the Assad regime, which was viewed as an extension of Iranian influence. The report observed that Salafist, Muslim Brotherhood, and Al-Qaeda in Iraq forces were the primary drivers of the insurgency, suggesting US policymakers were aware of the risks and potential strategic benefits of empowering such groups against Assad.

While mainstream analyses often portray US support for Syrian rebels as an attempt to back 'moderate' forces amid a complex civil war, Kent's account points to deeper cynicism in proxy warfare. Israel has conducted numerous strikes in Syria targeting Iranian and Hezbollah assets, and reports have documented Israeli medical treatment of wounded anti-Assad fighters, including extremists. Critics of Kent, including pieces in Jewish Currents and National Review, argue his framing overemphasizes Israeli influence and veers into conspiratorial territory, asserting that US decisions in Iraq and Syria stemmed from broader American strategic goals, not external manipulation.

The fall of Assad in late 2024 and the subsequent rise of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)—a rebranded Al-Qaeda affiliate now leading Syria—adds contemporary relevance. Kent criticized HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa for his jihadist history, warning that rebranding does not erase terrorist roots. This episode underscores recurring patterns in Middle East geopolitics: the use of extremist proxies in regime-change efforts, blowback from such policies, and the intersection of US, Israeli, and Sunni Gulf state interests against the Iran-led 'Axis of Resistance.'

Kent's whistleblowing, coming from a senior counterterrorism official with personal loss in the fight against ISIS (his first wife was killed in an ISIS-linked attack), raises uncomfortable questions about whether stated counterterrorism objectives have consistently masked geopolitical maneuvering.