A seven-week US-led conflict with Iran has rapidly drained American weapons stockpiles, resulting in delayed deliveries of critical munitions to NATO allies through 2026-2028. Estonian officials confirmed that ammunition for the M142 HIMARS system—already paid for via US Foreign Military Sales—is now on indefinite hold, with some shipments pushed years into the future. Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur noted limited information on timelines but emphasized that ammunition deliveries have been paused across allies, hoping that higher defense spenders like Estonia might receive priority once stocks replenish. Former Estonian Defence Forces commander Gen. (ret.) Martin Herem assessed that delays under three years would be manageable but warned of the need for alternatives, including potential South Korean systems from Hanwha Aerospace or compatible munitions from other producers pending US approvals. This situation is not isolated to the Baltics. Reuters reported that US officials privately informed multiple European partners, including Baltic and Scandinavian nations, of impending delays due to the prioritization of American operational needs following intensive operations against Iran that began with strikes in late February 2026. The strain compounds years of drawdowns from support to Ukraine and Israel, revealing deeper systemic issues in US munitions production and sustainment. Mainstream coverage has often framed the Iran conflict through tactical or diplomatic lenses, yet the ERR report and corroborating statements from Lithuanian and Estonian leaders highlight a quieter crisis: the fragility of just-in-time global supply chains for precision-guided rockets and artillery. HIMARS systems, prized for their accuracy at 300km ranges, have been pivotal in Ukraine, yet both Kyiv and NATO frontline states now face shortages in the very munitions that define modern standoff warfare. Deeper connections emerge when viewing this through the lens of sustained multi-theater commitments. Prior to Iran, US stocks were already stressed by Ukraine aid; the rapid expenditure of rockets, missiles, and interceptors against Iranian proxies and hardened targets has forced a strategic pause on exports. This overextension underscores logistical brittleness—decades of consolidated defense manufacturing mean replenishment cannot scale quickly. Analysts note parallels to historical cases where great powers found their arsenals exhausted faster than industrial bases could recover, potentially inviting opportunism from adversaries like Russia or China. European responses are accelerating: Estonia's recent supplemental HIMARS order and exploration of Turkish, Israeli, or domestic alternatives signal a push toward diversified sourcing. However, interoperability challenges and reliance on US approvals for certain systems persist. The broader implication, often glossed over, is a forced reevaluation of alliance burdensharing. If US munitions reserves cannot simultaneously support a high-intensity conflict in the Middle East while arming European deterrence against Russia, the post-WWII security architecture shows genuine strain. Upcoming discussions with US officials, including Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, may clarify exceptions or accelerated production ramps, but current signals point to prolonged constraints. This episode reveals not merely a temporary shortfall but a warning on military overextension in an era of great power competition.