
OpenRouter drops 3 providers and 125 endpoints after months of prompt theft
OpenRouter cut three inference providers and 125 Zero Data Retention endpoints after Dragos canaries showed months of prompt copying inside hosts that did not know they were breached. The same method also caught marketplace logging and an unnamed lab retrieving links from prompts marked not to be stored. A privacy flag is not a control once a middleman can read the request.
OpenRouter said it removed three AI inference providers and pulled 125 endpoints off Zero Data Retention eligibility after Dragos reported months of prompt theft inside those hosts. The earliest intrusion began in mid-July. None of the three knew until researchers told them, the industrial cybersecurity firm said. OpenRouter, a gateway that routes customer requests to third-party models, said its own systems were not breached and that it notified potentially affected customers. Some of the stolen requests carried the Zero Data Retention flag, a setting meant to keep a prompt from being stored.
Dragos seeded about two million prompts with unique links and credentials between July and November and watched for reuse. A planted secret can be learned in only one place, so later use means the prompt was read. In the largest case, a couple hundred AWS keys went out once each, in short late-October windows. Every request in those windows was stolen, including some rejected before a model ran, which indicates a copy at the first hop. The thief tested keys within hours, listed S3 buckets, searched Secrets Manager and Parameter Store, and tried to create Bedrock keys and IAM users.
One actor appears to have compromised two providers at once, using secrets from both on a single rented server. On November 1 that actor ran ARTEX, an AI penetration-testing framework, only to confirm keys were still live. Agents artex-agent and artex-judge-r121 are absent from public indicator lists Dragos checked. Separately, marketplace sellers priced models cheaply, enabled logging, and collected traffic from what looked like home connections. One, on a Mac in France, took passwords from two prompts and typed root SSH attempts by hand. Another router quietly forwarded traffic to that market without telling the customer; it later said it stopped.
An unnamed Chinese lab fetched secret links from more than half the seeded prompts sent to its models between July and October, including about two-thirds marked no collection or Zero Data Retention. U.S. hosts reselling those models triggered the same scraper, so the prompts flowed back to the lab. One large U.S. provider kept requesting a secret link more than two months later. The technical record shows the links were fetched. It does not name the lab or a state sponsor, and Dragos claimed neither. That is the exposure for anyone sending keys through a gateway they do not operate.
Companies that send cloud keys, passwords, and repository paths through OpenRouter are exposed at inference hosts and resellers they do not run, including on requests marked Zero Data Retention.
Sources (1)
- [1]Original source(https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/openrouter-drops-3-providers-after.html)